

Breaking the Mirror

A Look at Apple's New iPhone Remote Control Feature

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
Who am I




- Aaron Schlitt
- Cybersecurity M.Sc. Student at Hasso Plattner Institute, Uni Potsdam
- Researcher at *Cybersecurity – Mobile Security* chair of Jiska Classen

How It Started


*approximately



User Experience



User Experience



Awareness Features in iOS



Permanent notification on lock screen

Notification after next unlock



AirDrop

Handoff

**Continuity
Camera**

Sidecar


Apple Continuity

Universal
Clipboard

What's behind this?

(with a lot of knowledge from Inga Dischinger's work)

AWDL and LLW




Apple Wireless Direct Link



Low-Latency Wi-Fi



AWDL Key Management



Threat Model



Is my iPhone Locked?



Is my iPhone Locked?



Threat Model of iPhone Mirroring

No camera access

No microphone access

No PIN/Biometrics settings Access



No app/data access

Remote control is obvious to users

iPhones must remain secure while they are remote controlled.

iPhones might be accessed unwantedly and should provide safeguards against misuse in this case.

macOS as Attack Surface for iOS

- Previously: Very limited access to iOS devices from macOS
- Mainly via data shared over iCloud

- macOS: Far more open approach than iOS
 - Can run unsigned software
 - Can disable security features (SIP)

→ Higher risk for malware and abuse


iPhone Mirroring could create a direct path from macOS compromise to iPhone compromise

Swapping AWDL Keys with FRIDA

- Requires (multiple) SIP-disabled Macs
- Hook signing functions in rapportd on Mac

FRIDA

- Extract keys on Mac 1
 - Insert keys into RAM on Mac 2 before signing function runs
- iPhone Mirroring still works on a Mac that was previously paired
- iPhone Mirroring cannot be tricked into talking to an unpaired Mac



Future Work: Additional Cryptography in iPhone Mirroring



- Security Hardware might be used
- Very hardware-dependent firmware




Implementation Issues


Schrödinger's iPhone

iPhone Mirroring Effects in iOS

On the iPhone



Via iPhone Mirroring





iMac
macOS 15 Beta 2

iPhone SE (2020)

iOS 18 Beta 2

Paired to Mac for iPhone Mirroring

Hey Siri!

- iOS 18 Beta 2: Siri treated iPhone as unlocked when connected via Mirroring
- Attackers were able to send and read messages from the lock screen
- Fixed in public release of iOS 18

Siri Treats Locked iPhone as Unlocked When Connected via iPhone Mirroring

OE198876583585
Reported on 19/07/2024, 09:32



We've addressed the issue in all planned releases.



Your report is now resolved.

The issue you reported has been addressed. Thank you for working with us to protect our users.

ADDRESSED IN >



iOS 18 and iPadOS 18
macOS Sequoia 15



ADVISORY >

Preview Available


Camera and Microphone Access



(No, this is not a placeholder)

Prevent Spying
using iPhone
Mirroring?

Shortcuts to the Rescue!



- Create Shortcut with a delay
- Trigger shortcut and disconnect

- Can make recordings and upload them, initiate FaceTime calls

iPhone Mirroring Camera and Microphone Block Bypass Using Shortcuts



We're reviewing your report.





This is expected behavior.

We reviewed your report, and determined it references expected behavior. If you have new information that you didn't include in your report, providing it now may allow us to review your report further.

Or So I Thought...

- Reported in July 2024; Closed as *expected behaviour* four days later
- Retesting in December (iOS 18.2) shows that issue has in fact been fixed: All running shortcuts are interrupted when iPhone Mirroring disconnects.



Persisting and Hiding Access


iPhone Mirroring Access is Temporary and Evident

- Regularly re-enter PIN on iPhone
- Notifications for current and past connections
- Connection History



iMac

macOS 15



iPhone SE (2020)

iOS 18

Paired to Mac for iPhone Mirroring



Hiding Access

- iPhone Mirroring settings can be accessed from mirroring connection
- Removing all Macs hides the corresponding settings entry and history

iPhone Mirroring: Mac Can Be Hidden in List of Last Connected Devices




We're reviewing your report.



We're unable to identify a security issue in your report.

We reviewed your report and were unable to identify a security issue. If you have new information that you didn't include in your report, providing it now may allow us to review your report further.

Gaining Persistence



Add devices




Add Networks



Install Apps and give permissions


Stolen Device Protection

Stolen Device Protection




- Protects against device theft where PIN might be acquired as well
- Biometrics as the highest-security authentication
 - Required for iCloud password change
 - Required to access locked apps
- Further security features
 - Reboot iPhone after 72h when not unlocked
 - Change iCloud settings only after a timeout

SDP Access Vectors




Without SDP



With SDP

SDP with iPhone Mirroring



SDP Authentication

Using iPhone Mirroring to Bypass Biometrics Restriction of Stolen Device Protection On Locked Apps




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Summary

- iPhone Mirroring is a complex and unprecedented feature from a security perspective
 - Apple attempted to introduce a number of safeguards
 - Initial implementations contained critical bugs
 - Apparent threat Model is not implemented consistently
-
- Officially define threat model
 - Protect critical resources and don't allow remote access
 - Properly assess reports by researchers

Questions?

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